This paper deals with the New Zealand developments in family property law during this century. When New Zealand was colonized in 1840 it inherited English common law, and with it the concept of private property. Towards the end of the last century private property rights were virtually absolute, subject only to a personal duty to support financially dependant family members.
INTRODUCTION
When New Zealand was colonized in 1840' it inherited the English statutes, common law and equity appropriate to the New Zealand situation.
2 At that time there was very little recognition in English law of special property interests in the context of the family. Conventional property rules applied. Private property was the norm and owners were free to deal with their property as they saw fit with few concessions to the family. This was also the law in New Zealand until the beginning of this century. Family members had at most a personal right of support and even that was limited to the supporter's lifetime. 3 The twentieth century has seen some remarkable changes in this area of law, and New Zealand has been at the forefront of some of these changes. The result today is that the family relationship is increasingly giving rise to real property rights, particularly in New Zealand. The conventional property rights accorded to individual owners have been significantly curtailed in favour of family property rights during the owner's lifetime and on death.
As might be expected, these developments did not occur overnight. It has been a gradual process over a period of some 100 years, with a spurt in the last twenty years. It would also be wrong to suggest that the process is now complete. It is still very much evolving, but New Zealand has reached a cross-roads which may see a further erosion of or a reversion to private property rights. 4 These developments, largely a result of judicial activism and government policy, have not occurred without criticism, particularly in recent years. Reform in the near future seems likely. It is therefore appropriate at this time to examine these developments and to consider their implications. Are we gradually, albeit in piecemeal fashion, moving towards a concept of family property in which the rights of the individual are subject to the overriding rights of the family as a whole? If so, then the full consequences of such a change should be appreciated. Moreover, if such a fundamental change is thought to be desirable, then it should be publicly debated and comprehensively addressed. This paper will consider the developments during this century in three stages. In the first stage, which I shall call the 'support stage', owners were limited in their dealings with property only by their duty to support their spouse and children. This duty did not create any real rights to property. It was merely a personal right to support, which has existed since time immemorial as an integral part of most legal systems. It was the only concession to family rights until 1963 when the second stage began.
This second stage will be referred to as the 'contribution stage'. It started in the sixties when it was recognized that matrimonial assets could be accumulated by direct and indirect means, through financial as well as non-financial contributions. This led to the introduction of the Matrimonial Property Act in 1963, which gave one spouse the right to a share of the matrimonial property legally owned by the other spouse based on contributions made to that property.
This was the first acknowledgement that conventional property rules were too restrictive to meet the needs of the marital relationship and that special rules would be required to reflect the different ways in which matrimonial property is accumulated. Although the Act substantially expanded the type of contribution which could give rise to a property interest, it still adhered to conventional property notions. Its focus remained on contributions to property, rather than the relationship per se. As such contributions have traditionally resulted in real property rights, 5 the principles embodied in this Act had the potential for wider application and have since been used to resolve property disputes in other family relationships, such as between cohabitants.
The third stage is a recent development. I shall call it the 'relationship stage', because there are signs in New Zealand that the family relationship itself may give rise to real property rights. These signs are particularly evident in the discretion exercised by the courts in favour of adult children when redistributing their parents' estates on death under the Family Protection Act. But they can also be seen in the recent changes to the Government's social welfare policy which have placed increased responsibilities on the family. These changes may force us to abandon individualistic notions inherent in the concept of private property in favour of a concept of family property. This paper will describe this three stage development in more detail in Part Two. Part Three will then consider the extent to which we have moved towards a concept of family property and what the implications would be if we were formally to adopt such a concept.
PROPERTY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FAMILY IN NEW ZEALAND

A. The Support Stage
The English common law, as inherited by New Zealand in 1840, included in the context of marriage the principle of matrimonial unity. According to this principle a husband and wife became one person for legal purposes, under the husband's control. 6 On marriage the husband automatically acquired ownership of most of his wife's personal property and extensive rights over the rest of her property. In return for this bounty she was entitled only to maintenance during the marriage and a limited life interest, called the dower, on his death. 7 A wife's right to maintenance persists to this day, 8 although her husband acquired a reciprocal right in 1939. 9 However, the Family Proceedings Act 1980 now provides that each spouse is liable to maintain the other during marriage only to the extent that such maintenance is necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the other spouse. 10 The right to maintenance is therefore no longer automatic and spouses are expected to support themselves.
Children too have a right to financial support from their parents in accordance with their parents' capacity to provide support." Having brought them into this world, both parents are obliged to provide maintenance and nourishment for their children until they are capable of supporting themselves. That duty can be statutorily enforced through the Child Support Act 1991 until the child turns nineteen, marries or becomes financially independent.
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Although the parental duty can not be enforced beyond the limits of the Child Support Act, unmarried students below the age of twenty-five are no longer entitled to state support if their parents have a joint income above a certain level. 13 The right to free education, once the corner stone of New Zealand society, has been virtually abolished as part of the recent economic reforms. A tough parental means test has been introduced, which suggests that children are entitled to expect financial assistance from their parents while they obtain tertiary qualifications. These reforms have significantly extended the duty of support but, in the absence of enforcement measures or legal limitations on the parents' property rights, the child's right is at most a moral one.
When the wife's right of dower was abolished in New Zealand in 1874 she lost what limited rights she had to support from her husband's estate on his death.
14 The children's right to support did not extend beyond death either. Testamentary abuse by some men, prompted the Women's Movement, still heady from its success in securing voting rights for women, to call for legislative controls on testamentary freedom. 15 It took four years and five Bills before the Testator's Family Maintenance Act, subsequently renamed the Family Protection Act, was finally adopted in 1900.
16
Initial proposals were based on the Scottish system of forced heirship. They would have restricted the power of testation to a half or a third of the estate and guaranteed the remainder to the surviving spouse and children.
17 Such a general limitation proved too great an inroad on the absolute freedom of testation solely to curb the abuse of a few testators. Concern was expressed that a right of inheritance would reward the undeserving and give women property which they might then use to support another husband.
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The statute which Parliament finally adopted gave the court the discretion on an application from a surviving spouse 19 or child of the deceased to order such further provision from the deceased estate as it thought fit if the testator had failed to make 'adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support' of the applicant.
20
It was clearly intended only as a maintenance provision to prevent the destitution of spouses and children who were financially dependant on the deceased. Several parliamentarians characterized the reform as an extension of the Destitute Persons Act, which empowered the court to order a living relative of sufficient means to provide the basic necessities of life to a destitute family member. 21 As McNab said when he introduced the final Bill to Parliament:
[This Bill] says: Before you dispose of your property, first carry out your obligations; first see that you do not leave any person destitute; first see that any person who is at present dependant on you for his or her support and maintenance is not left on the State for support . . .
M
The Act was thus aimed at ensuring that the burden of maintenance fell upon the family rather than on the State. Cast in these terms, the Bill was acceptable to all but a few Members of Parliament. 23 This was also the way the Act was initially applied. In the first case to come to court, Edwards J used the Destitute Persons Act to distinguish between claims from widows and those from adult children. 24 While a husband was legally bound to support his wife he had no such obligation to his adult children unless they came within the scope of the Destitute Persons Act. But, while the widow had first claim on the testator, his duty 'was merely to provide for an adequate maintenance for his wife during her lifetime. It did not extend to providing her with a fund which she could give to others at her death '. 25 This mentality persisted beyond the adoption of the Matrimonial Property Act in 1963. While widows had a paramount claim to maintenance from the estate, commensurate with the lifestyle they had enjoyed during their marriage, it was qualified both by the size of the estate and by the competing claims of others also entitled to support from the testator. 26 Even if liberal maintenance was ordered it was almost always in the form of an annuity or periodic payment, rather than a capital sum, and usually limited to the period of widowhood. 27 The court explained the reason for this approach in re Crewe in 1956: No doubt in these days there are husbands who may consider that they do owe a duty to make some provision for their widows irrespective of their remarriage, but, from the earliest times, the law has recognized that a husband has such an interest in his wife's widowhood as to make it lawful for him to restrain her from making a second marriage by making a condition that on such remarriage any provision he may have made for her shall cease . . .
Even the adoption of the Matrimonial Property Act in 1963 did not persuade the courts to alter their approach to widows' claims. As Hardie Boys J said in 1965:
It can be argued that these newly enacted provisions tend to show a modern view of marriage as a partnership with rights akin to that of partners in the partnership property: but I have yet to learn that the result is that, in a Family Protection Act application, matrimonial capital will always be shared out between husband and wife irrespective of the need of the wife to be adequately provided with proper maintenance and support. It is only where that proper maintenance cannot be provided except by awarding capital that an exception is made to the general rule.
29
Widowers were treated with even less sympathy. They were usually the principal if not the sole breadwinner in the family and were thus seldom able to show financial dependence on their wives. The courts were quite open in their reluctance to treat widowers favourably. As Cooke J said in 1953: '[t]he jurisdiction ... is exercised more sparingly in the case of an application by a widower than in the case of an application by a widow'. 30 A widower succeeded only if he was financially dependant on his wife during her lifetime and was unable to maintain himself without further provision from her estate.
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The very early approach towards children was similarly conservative and firmly based on financial dependence. Adult children in particular were successful only if they were entitled to financial support during their parent's lifetime. 32 However, this narrow approach, stimulated by the Destitute Persons Act, was soon rejected in favour of a more liberal approach. Even if a child had not been financially dependant on the deceased, he or she might still be able to claim further provision from the estate, provided there was evidence that they were unable to support themselves in the style appropriate to their standing in life.
33
Despite this more liberal attitude, the gender bias in the courts' decisions shows that intervention was still very much based on financial need. Adult sons were seldom successful because they were expected to be self supporting, 34 whereas unmarried daughters were usually supported by their parents until they were married when their husbands would become responsible for their maintenance.
35
Financial need continued to dominate these applications despite attempts by the Privy Council 36 and the Court of Appeal 37 to broaden the basis of intervention by emphasizing that the legislation provided for 'proper' rather than 'adequate' maintenance. In the eyes of many judges the Family Protection Act was still a maintenance provision and an extension of the inter vivos duty of support. 38 It was not to be used as a general limitation on the freedom of testation until much later.
Financial need is still the principal reason for intervening in testamentary wishes today, although its meaning extends well beyond the necessities of life to avoid destitution. 39 It includes not only current need, but also provision for possible future need, such as emergencies, health problems and unexpected financial losses. The duty of support has thus been broadened significantly. Nevertheless, based as it is on financial need, these claims could still be regarded as part of the personal right of support.
At present it is up to the family member to lodge a claim under the Act, and indeed most people would do so to avoid dependence on the State, particularly following the substantial cuts in welfare benefits in recent times. But there is no duty to seek further provision. A recent legislative proposal indicated a change in that position. The Social Welfare Reform Bill would in effect have compelled further provision from a deceased estate in favour of a surviving spouse who was in need of financial support from the State, but the relevant clause was struck out at the committee stage. 40 It is nevertheless an indication of government thinking in this area. If the Bill had been enacted in its proposed form, the duty of support would have been unavoidable. The State would have reduced yet further the 'fatherly' responsibilities it assumed earlier this century, when it 'relieved many persons of their moral duty by taking it upon itself to provide financial support for the aged, the sick, and the unemployed'.
B. The Contribution Stage
Matrimonial reform in previous centuries in England, and the Married Women's Property Act of 1884 in New Zealand, had eliminated the wife's disabilities to acquire, hold and dispose of property. 42 The principle of matrimonial unity was replaced by the principle of separate property. While these reforms were no doubt a great advance for married women, few wives would have been in a position in those days to take advantage of their increased proprietary capacity to acquire a substantial estate of their own. They were generally unemployed and depended on gifts and inheritances to build up their own estate.
43
They had no right to share in the property accumulated by their husbands, unless they had made financial contributions to those assets, in which case the conventional rules of property permitted the imposition of a resulting trust. 44 As one commentator observed in 1960: 'there [was] no such thing as matrimonial property . . ,'.
45 Community of property between husband and wife, as it is known in many civil law countries, has never been part of English common law. The only limitation on the private property rights of owners prior to 1963 was the duty of support inter vivos through the Destitute Persons Act and, on a slightly broader basis, on death through the Family Protection Act.
The contribution stage commenced in 1963 with the introduction of the Matrimonial Property Act. This Act fundamentally changed property rights between spouses. It acknowledged the indirect contribution of the home maker to the matrimonial assets in cases of dispute over property rights. In the absence of a dispute, though, the former rules continued to apply, leaving spouses free to deal with their respective assets as they wished. The Act was nevertheless a recognition that 'the cockbird can feather his nest precisely because he is not required to spend most of his time sitting in it'.
46
The Act introduced the concept of matrimonial property: property which, irrespective of legal title, has been acquired as a result of direct or indirect contributions of the husband and the wife. Under the Act the court had the power to redistribute matrimonial property in whatever manner it saw fit, 47 but having regard to 'the respective contributions of the husband and wife to the property in dispute (whether in the form of money payments, services, prudent management, or otherwise howsoever)'.
48
The court was obliged to take these contributions into account in disputes concerning the matrimonial home, and was permitted to do so in disputes involving the balance of the matrimonial property.
49
Unfortunately the Act did not receive a liberal interpretation from the Court of Appeal: traditional property notions continued to dominate judicial thinking. The Court of Appeal held in E v E that claimants must not only prove their contributions with a fair degree of precision, but must also identify the specific items of property to which the contributions had been made. 50 Further tending to restrict the wife's chances of sharing in property other than the home, was the Act's distinction between the compulsory and permissive consideration of respective spousal contributions to the property in dispute. A wife was generally only entitled to a share of her husband's business if it had been run 'more or less jointly'. 51 Moreover, the conservative evaluation of domestic contributions meant that awards seldom exceeded one third of the value of the home. 52 Fortunately, many of the problems created by E v E were removed by the Privy Council in Haidant v Haldane.
bi Although contributions to property were still a prerequisite to a successful claim, for which the burden of proof lay on the claimant, Lord Simon of Glaisdale firmly rejected the Court of Appeal's asset by asset approach as being without foundation and contrary to legislative intent. 54 His Lordship argued that Parliament intended to remedy the injustice suffered by many married women by freeing the law of matrimonial property from the shackles of strict legal and equitable rights .... The intention was to leave the court with an unfettered discretion ... to make such order as does justice between the parties in all the circumstances -recognizing that in the nature of things the wife's contribution to the marriage partnership is generally domestic.
55
The Act accordingly required a liberal interpretation if it was to remedy this defect and achieve the purpose Parliament had intended. 56 His Lordship reasoned that the wife's performance of ordinary housewifely duties ranks for consideration, even though it makes no direct contribution to the acquisition or enhancement in value of the matrimonial home. It is nevertheless an indirect contribution to its retention as an asset within the family: the husband would otherwise either himself have to perform such domestic duties, to the detriment of activities more immediately profitable financially, or he would have to pay someone else to perform them, to the pro tanto diminution of his assets.
57
Viewed in this light domestic contributions are more easily related not only to the matrimonial home, but also to other assets accumulated in the husband's name. This interpretation offers women much greater scope in their claims for a fair share of the matrimonial property, without entirely abandoning conventional property notions. However, the Privy Council decision came too late to prevent legislative reform. A new Matrimonial Property Act was promulgated in 1976. This Act created a new regime of property sharing, focusing on contributions to the marriage relationship rather than the matrimonial property. 58 It is therefore more appropriately considered in the relationship section below.
The 1976 Act is a substantial advance on the 1963 Act, particularly for wives, but it applies only on separation and divorce, leaving the old Act to govern property distribution on death. 59 Widows, in particular, are still left with the unenviable burden of proving contributions to property and run the risk of a conservative judicial assessment of their value. 60 It is only in the last five or six years that widows have regularly managed to secure a half share of the matrimonial property legally owned by their late husbands. 61 Contributions have also been the basis for judicial intervention in the distribution of property between unmarried cohabitants, or de facto spouses as they are more commonly called in New Zealand. Unlike married couples, though, cohabitants have had to rely on the law of equity, in particular the constructive trust, 62 to acquire a share of the assets accumulated during the relationship. 63 An earlier proposal to extend the provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 to these relationships met with such opposition that it was dropped before the Bill was passed into law. 64 It was feared that the inclusion of de facto relationships in matrimonial legislation would devalue marriage. De facto spouses are instead forced to argue that a constructive trust should be imposed to recognize their contributions to the property legally owned by the defendants.
65
A variety of grounds have been used to justify the imposition of such a trust. English claimants have to show that the parties had a common intention to share the property beneficially, which the defendants have subsequently sought to deny. 66 The difficulty of proving the existence of a common intention in circumstances where the parties are unlikely to have addressed their minds to the legal consequences of their property dealings, led the courts in other jurisdictions to adopt a different basis for intervention. The Canadian courts use the doctrine of unjust enrichment, 67 the Australians have opted for unconscionability, 68 while New Zealand relies on the reasonable expectations of both parties, objectively determined or, alternatively, the doctrine of estoppel.
69
There is no real difference in substance between the various grounds used by the different jurisdictions. 70 The requirements which must be satisfied are in essence the same: contribution or sacrifice on the part of the claimant which is referable to the acquisition, improvement or retention of assets legally owned by the defendant and any evidence of the parties' expectations of sharing the property. 71 It is in this last requirement that the parties' intentions become relevant. Where there is evidence of an agreement in respect of the property, it will be upheld. 72 Similarly, if the owner has made it abundantly clear to the claimant that the property will not be shared, there can be no reasonable expectation of acquiring an interest in that property. 73 Contributions made in the latter circumstances must be deemed to be in the nature of a gift or payment for benefits received.
In the absence of clear evidence of the parties' thinking, which is common in these close relationships, the New Zealand courts will apply an objective test, whereas the courts in the other jurisdictions tend to manipulate the true facts or to infer an intention where none existed. The basis for intervention is thus far from principled, even if the end result seems fair.
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What really prompts the courts to act is not so much the parties' thinking, but the contribution made by the plaintiff to the property in dispute. That is the key ingredient. When constructive trusts were first used to resolve property disputes between unmarried couples, financial contributions to the property were essential and an intention to share was inferred from such contributions. 75 That is still the general position in England. 76 The courts in New Zealand, Canada and Australia, on the other hand, have adopted a more liberal attitude. They recognize that unmarried cohabitants do not approach each other at arm's length, but live and deal with each other as if they were married. Accordingly, both direct and indirect contributions are relevant to the award of a beneficial interest in the property. Normal spousal services will justify the imposition of a constructive trust provided they are referable to the property in dispute.
77 Lord Simon's comment in Haldane v Haldane twenty years ago is now equally applicable to unmarried couples.
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De facto couples in new Zealand today are in a position very similar to married couples immediately following the Privy Council decision in Haldane v Haldane. And, like married couples in those days, the awards for unmarried couples have tended to be quite conservative. The courts have repeatedly stated that this is appropriate as their relationship is not to be equated with marriage.
79 Such a view might have accorded with society's expectations twenty years ago, but the dramatic increase in such relationships in recent years, has placed renewed pressure on Parliament to introduce legislation along the lines of the 1976 Matrimonial Property Act, and that may soon be forthcoming.
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The constructive trust was of course not developed specifically to meet the needs of unmarried cohabitants. It is a conventional property concept imposed by the courts of equity to prevent owners from insisting on their strict legal rights when this would offend against the principles of equity and good conscience. 81 It is therefore potentially of general application. However, the closeness of de facto relationships means that it is easier to establish the requirements for a constructive trust in this context than it is in the commercial sphere. Property dealings take place in an atmosphere of trust in which the parties often do not consider, let alone protect, their respective legal interests, as they would be expected to do if they were strangers.
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This reasoning is not confined to de facto relationships. It has also been successfully employed in other family relationships. 83 Whatever the relationship, the essential requirements remain the same and evidence of contributions to the property in dispute is an essential prerequisite to the acquisition of a property interest.
Contributions have also been used in support of Family Protection claims, particularly by children, 84 and occasionally by parents. 85 Unpaid labour or care of the deceased by the claimant are common reasons for making awards from the estate. In a survey of 235 cases brought by children between 1985 and 1994, approximately 20 per cent succeeded on this basis. 86 Although these claims are seldom analysed in the narrow terms of a constructive trust, or even a claim under the Matrimonial Property Act of 1963, they are nevertheless easily translated into contributions referable to the property in the deceased estate. Family Protection claims on grounds of contributions are thus merely an extension of existing inter vivos property rights.
C. The Relationship Stage
In the last twenty years there have been suggestions that the relationship itself should give rise to real property rights. It commenced with the adoption of the Matrimonial Property Act in 1976. This Act focuses for the first time on the relationship rather than on the property dealings of the parties, its philosophy being that marriage is a partnership between equals. It operates on the presumption that the parties have contributed equally to the marriage partnership and accordingly deserve equal shares of the matrimonial property on dissolution of the marriage. 87 Matrimonial property has been widely defined so that the effect of the Act is that most couples share equally in all the property acquired during their marriage. 88 The presumption of equal sharing is, however, rebuttable in the case of grossly unequal contributions 89 and does not apply to marriages of short duration 90 nor to property acquired before or inherited during the marriage. 91 Nor will the presumption apply if the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. 92 While these exceptions suggest a conflict in the philosophical basis of the Act, the rationale for the exceptions may be sought in the unequal contribution to the partnership rather than the property. The property rights could thus be said to arise from the relationship itself, rather than a broad view of contributions to property. 93 However, an interpretation more in keeping with conventional property notions is equally possible, as will be shown in Part Three.
Dramatic as this reform appeared to be, the Act is now the subject of considerable criticism. Its aim of creating equality between the marriage partners has not been achieved in the majority of cases. While the Act divides the accumulated capital equally between the parties, it does not address income or intangible assets, such as the earning capacity of the respective parties. The end result is that, a few years after separation, women are usually substantially worse off than their former husbands.
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The Department of Justice is currently reviewing the matrimonial property legislation in an attempt to achieve equality between the parties.
95
The Matrimonial Property Act has nonetheless had considerable influence on other family property claims. It has gradually persuaded the courts to be more generous in their assessment of spousal services under the 1963 Matrimonial Property Act, and 50 per cent awards are now common rather than exceptional.
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De facto spouses have also put pressure on the courts 'to reflect "societal dictates" by focusing on their relationship rather than their property dealings. 97 This has been partially successful in that a reasonable expectation of a proprietary interest will now be presumed in New Zealand, unless a contrary intention has been expressed. 98 Positive proof seems to have been replaced by a presumption of sharing if the relationship was of reasonable duration.
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Attempts to eliminate the requirement of a causal link between the contributions and the property in which an interest is claimed have been less successful. Change in this area has thus far been resisted both in New Zealand and in Canada, because the proprietary basis of the constructive trust limits both the nature of the claim and the extent of any interest accorded under the constructive trust.
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Yet, the possibility of some relaxation in the requirement of causation has not been rejected entirely. The Court of Appeal recently appeared to support the view expressed in the lower court that the determination of what is unconscionable and, for that reason, may call for equitable intervention, is not likely to be adequately regulated by rules of causation or other precise linkages between benefits granted and benefits reasonably expected in return.
101
It nevertheless seems unlikely that the courts will go so far as to cut the constructive trust loose from its proprietary origins. What seems more likely is that the demands of society will be met by the introduction of legislation which places de facto relationships on a similar or equal footing with marital relationships, as has been done in some Australian states.
102
The significance of the family relationship in the creation of real property rights is particularly pronounced in claims by adult financially independent children against the deceased estates of their parents. The Family Protection Act may have started life as an extension of the Destitute Persons Act, providing maintenance for children who were financially dependent on the deceased, but it is now frequently used to recognize the special relationship which is assumed to exist between parent and child.
The survey of 235 cases, referred to earlier, showed that more than one quarter of the adult children who claimed had no financial need, even in its broadest sense, 104 nor had they made contributions to the deceased or the estate beyond the normal incidents expected in a family relationship. 105 These claimants nonetheless succeeded because, as one judge put it:
[children's] needs are not in the strict sense for maintenance or monetary provision but are rather to recognize the family connection and relationship, the familial demand . . . Furthermore, a purely nominal award may not be sufficient to recognize this familial association. In re Fowler, for example, the court held that even though one of the claimants had a million dollars worth of assets, ... he was entitled to recognition as a dutiful son of the deceased for all their joint lives, and that the acknowledged breach of moral duty to him [could], according to established authority, be satisfied by more than a purely nominal award. 107 The current judicial view clearly is that parents have a moral duty to leave at least some of their estate to their children. Disinheritance is frowned upon, and should be used sparingly, because it excludes a child not only from the estate, but also from the family bond 'as though he were worthless'. 108 Estrangement or disentitling conduct is seldom accepted as a reason for complete disinheritance, although it may reduce the moral duty. 109 Only the greater competing need of others in an estate too small to do justice to all moral claimants is a justifiable reason for limiting or even excluding a child from the will, 110 and even then the courts have tried to make some provision for a disappointed claimant.
1 " Where they have felt unable to assist the claimants, courts have expressed their sense of frustration and regretted their inability to remedy the unfairness of the will." prevented many testators from executing a will which was likely to be overridden on death." 4 It is no overstatement to say that children nowadays have a right to share in their parent's estate, irrespective of age or financial position, and any attempt to exclude them, without compelling reason, attracts judicial condemnation.
Several other common law countries, including the Australian states and England, have adopted legislation similar to the Family Protection Act. The Australian interpretation is very similar to the New Zealand one."
5 The 'bare fact of paternity' seems to attract the same judicial response there as it does in New Zealand." 6 The English approach is markedly different, particularly in its treatment of adult children.
1 " Under the old Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938, a child could only succeed if incapable of self-maintenance as a result of physical or mental disability or, in the case of a daughter, if she had never been married."
8 Although its successor, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, removed the requirement of disability and generally gave the court wider powers to intervene in the disposal of a deceased estate, the courts have adopted a very conservative approach." 9 Further provision is awarded to an adult child only where the need for maintenance has been clearly made out. In re Jennings Nourse LJ interpreted this to mean: those payments which will directly or indirectly enable the applicant in the future to discharge the cost of his daily living at whatever standard of living is appropriate to him . . .
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In that case the applicant was unsuccessful because, although he was the testator's only child and had been neglected by the testator for most of his life, he had no need of maintenance. His claim relied solely on his father/son relationship. Nourse LJ held that '[tjhough some may think that that ought to be a sufficient basis for an order, . . . such has not been held to have been the intention of Parliament'. 121 Had the applicant been in New Zealand or Australia, he would undoubtedly have succeeded.
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It is not only on death that the family relationship appears to be creating real property rights for its members. New Zealand's recent economic reforms, and in particular the decline in financial support from the state, are beginning to have a similar effect. The Government's policy of reducing public expenditure has resulted in many of its former responsibilities being transferred back to the family. 123 The parental means test for student allowances has already been mentioned. 124 While there is no legal duty on parents to support their children while they obtain tertiary qualifications, the means test does suggest that children are entitled to expect parents to apply their income for the benefit of their children's further education. The impression that the Government regards parental property as family property seems inescapable.
The new policy in regard to the elderly and the sick who are in need of indefinite residential care confirms this impression. Their eligibility for a state subsidy is assessed on the basis of the assets and the income not only of the applicant but also of the applicant's spouse. 125 It is only when the assets of both spouses have been virtually exhausted and their income has dropped below a certain level that the State provides financial assistance.
126 All readily realizable assets are affected, except the matrimonial home, if it is the principal residence of the applicant's spouse or a dependant child of the applicant.
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This has prompted many people to reduce their assets and income by transferring them to trusts or gifting them to their children. 128 But the government has dealt with this by giving the Director-General of Social Welfare the discretion to assess applicants and their spouses as if the deprivations had not taken place.
129 This discretion is extremely broad, because the term 'deprivation' has not been defined. 130 It could potentially include any alienation for less than full consideration. 131 The uncertainty surrounding the exercise of this discretion is compounded by the absence of a time limit within which the deprivations must have occurred. The Department of Social Welfare tends to look only at deprivations in the five years preceding the application, but that is merely departmental policy. 132 The legislation empowers the DirectorGeneral to consider any deprivations made at some time in the life of the applicant or the applicant's spouse.
The purpose of including these deprivations in the financial means assessment is not to set aside the transaction which led to the deprivation, but simply to decline, adjust or reduce the application for state support. 133 The applicant may then be left without the necessary means of self-support and will be dependent on the family or charity. These provisions suggest that the government would favour a change from individual ownership to a concept of family property, in which the rights of the family take precedence over the property rights of the apparent owners.
The New Zealand legislature and judiciary are thus driving in the same direction, albeit for quite different reasons. They are both focusing increasingly on the family relationship, and allowing it to determine the property rights of its members. The traditional rights inherent in the notion of private property are gradually being eroded by real property rights of family members. This suggests that we are moving towards a concept of family property in which private ownership is being replaced by family ownership.
This development marks a significant departure from the traditional rules of law and equity. The family relationship itself has traditionally only given rise to a personal right of support. The real property rights arising from contributions are in accord with conventional property principles, even if they have been somewhat extended beyond their traditional boundaries to take account of the different ways in which contributions are made in the context of a family relationship. To permit the family relationship itself to create real property rights is to convert a right in personam into a right in rem in breach of existing property principles.
Not surprisingly, this development has received considerable criticism.
134 Whether the family relationship should give rise to real property rights is a matter which should be publicly debated. The Department of Justice and the Law Commission are both reviewing various aspects of family property law at this very moment, and New Zealanders will soon have to make some important decisions about the future direction of property rights in the family context. 
TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF FAMILY PROPERTY
As indicated above, there are signs that the family relationship itself is giving rise to real property rights, rather than merely personal rights of support. The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 appears to do so, and so does the Family Protection Act when it makes awards in favour of adult financially independent children. Government policy is also curtailing individual property rights in favour of family property rights.
Some of these developments have been well received in spite of the consequential interference with private property rights. The principle of equal sharing in marriage and the imaginative use of the constructive trust in de facto relationships, for example, have been applauded. There are even demands to enhance the proprietary consequences of these relationships. The recent shift from state responsibility towards family responsibility and the liberal treatment of adult financially independent children in Family Protection claims, on the other hand, have been widely criticized. 136 The reason for these criticisms must be sought in the absence of a recognized legal or moral obligation underpinning these latter responsibilities as compared to the matrimonial type responsibilities.
The 1976 Matrimonial Property Act was hailed as revolutionary reform, because it shifted the focus from property to the marriage partnership. It was described above in the relationship section, because the property rights were said to arise from contributions to the relationship rather than the property. In reality though, the Act simply gave effect to what the parties were presumed to have agreed when they married.
Marriage is a contract, the terms of which are largely negotiable. As spouses commonly do not discuss their respective property rights, it is presumed that they intend the normal terms of a marriage to apply. They are premised on the principle that marriage is a partnership in which the spouses support each other and make equal, though different, contributions to the assets accumulated during the marriage. If the parties do not intend the normal consequences of marriage to apply, they are free to contract out of the Act. 137 The Matrimonial Property Act does no more than to give effect to the parties' presumed intentions in the absence of expressed intentions. It stops spouses from reneging on the terms of their marriage. It was revolutionary only to the extent that it recognized that spouses do not approach each other at arm's length to determine the proprietary consequences of their relationship, as strangers would be expected to do.
De facto spouses are in a similar position. Their relationship is also consensual. They are free to negotiate whatever terms suit their relationship but, as in the case of married spouses, most do not do that. They start living together and accumulate assets without a thought to the legal consequences of their actions. In the absence of legislation it has been left to the courts to find solutions to their property disputes. Solutions have centred on the property intentions of the parties, but as they are seldom expressed, they are inferred from the conduct of the parties.
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New Zealand has gone so far as to presume that the parties intend to share their assets if they have lived together for a substantial period of time, because that is the nature of most of those relationships.
139 If either party does not wish to do so, that intention should be made clear to the other party, in which case it will be upheld. 140 The similarity to marriage has been noted, except in the shares awarded. 141 Unequal sharing is still the norm in de facto relationships. This would be quite appropriate if that was in fact the parties' intention. In the absence of an agreement, however, it seems much more likely that they intended to share equally and that the unequal awards are not attributable to the reasonable expectations of the parties, but rather to judicial reluctance to treat such relationships as the equivalent of marriage. The concern to preserve the special status of marriage may explain this reluctance.
Property rights between married or unmarried partners therefore do not arise from the relationship as such, but rather from the agreement to contribute and share equally. This agreement may be expressed, implied or presumed. In each case it is the reasonable expectations of the parties which determine the property rights and they are enforced either through statute or through the common law. The property rules are not peculiar to the relationship; they accord with what the parties would probably have agreed had they put their minds to it. There is therefore a juristic reason for recognizing the property interests claimed which is in keeping with conventional legal principles.
The relationship between parent and child is quite different: u is a consequence of the act of procreation. By bringing children into the world, parents assume the responsibility of nurturing, protecting and educating their children until they are self-supporting. 142 The duty of support applies during the parents' lifetime and on their death, hence the introduction of the Family Protection Act.
The entitlement to support ceases once the child has become financially independent and self-sufficient. Such limitations as the duty of support imposes on a parent's property rights cease to exist from that point on and they are free to deal with their property as they see fit. Adult children have no legal claim to support from their parents during the latter's lifetime, not even if they are in financial need. So there does not appear to be any legal reason why they should have such a right on their parent's death.
Yet, the courts have granted them a right to share in their deceased parent's estate and have limited the freedom of testation accordingly. While it is natural for children to inherit their parent's estate, and for parents to wish to bestow this benefit on their children, it is difficult to see any principled basis for converting this natural act into a duty.
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Any expectation which children may have of inheriting from their parents should only be enforced if it is founded upon some legally recognized obligation, such as contract, restitution or the legal duty of support. An inheritance is otherwise impossible to distinguish from an inter vivos gift, the very essence of which is that it may be expected at appropriate times, but it is not compellable.
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The willingness of the courts to award adult financially independent children further provision from their deceased parent's estate is not justifiable in terms of the personal right to support nor does it comply with conventional property principles. It is thus in breach of the general legal principles which have regulated our society for most of this century.
These principles were developed in an era of declining interpersonal relations and increasing individualism. Family responsibility was gradually replaced by state responsibility. 145 A well-developed social welfare system took care of the sick, the aged and the unemployed, and provided free health care and education for all members of society. Private property rights were correspondingly increased. Owners had virtually complete freedom to deal with their property as they saw fit, subject only to a duty to support their spouse and infant children and to recognize the contributions made by others. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising to find testators objecting to the suggestion that they are no longer free to dispose of their property on death.
The recent decline in the social welfare system has been severely criticized, because it is forcing the family to resume financial responsibilities which previously had been assumed by the State. Free health care and education are a thing of the past. 146 Unemployment benefits have been reduced and state support for the long-term sick and the elderly is available only for the very poor. 147 The duty of support has been extended well beyond its former boundaries to limit dependence on the State.
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New Zealand has a long history of social responsibility in which its citizens paid their taxes in the expectation that the State would support them when they were in need. Against this background, it is hardly surprising to encounter strong resistance to the increased family responsibilities. The issue which causes most concern is the government's powers to include in the financial means assessment any deprivations made by the applicant or the applicant's spouse. 149 This in effect converts a personal right to support into a real property right with the consequential limitation on private property rights.
Given these developments what would the implications be if a concept of family property were to be formally adopted? Some are already beginning to emerge, while others are not yet apparent but are predictable. They are in part attributable to the process through which many of the rights are currently enforced, and in part the result of the substantive decisions made in the course of that process.
With the exception of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, the process is entirely discretionary and the decisions are accordingly unpredictable. This has created considerable uncertainty as to the extent to which private property rights will be curtailed. It seems undesirable for all concerned to allow this uncertainty to continue. If the family relationship is to give rise to real property rights then this should be formally regulated in legislation.
Another area of uncertainty relates to the definition of'family'. Some statutes, such as the Matrimonial Property and the Family Protection Acts, define the family conservatively, including only married couples and their children. 150 Parents, grandchildren, de facto spouses, homosexual partners and members of stepfamilies are excluded or accorded a secondary position. 151 While the courts have applied a broader interpretation where possible, they are limited by statutory provisions.
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Other statutes, including some which regulate the eligibility for state support, have a wider definition. 153 If family property rights are to be recognized, it will be essential to determine who should be accorded those rights. Modern family structures require an expanded definition reflective of reality.
The recognition of family property rights will also adversely affect dealings with third parties, if they are unaware of those rights. The Matrimonial Property Act 1976 goes some way to meet this problem by permitting interests in land to be noted against the title as a warning to unsuspecting outsiders. 154 If the family member is not a spouse, or the interest is not in land, there is at present little to prevent inappropriate dealings with third parties.
155 While conventional property rules could be useful in determining competing claims between family members and third parties, they are unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution in all cases. This issue will also have to be addressed if family property rights are to be upheld. Some owners will attempt to avoid the rights of family members by placing the property beyond their reach. There is some evidence of this already. As was explained earlier, trusts are commonly used to reduce a person's estate either to preserve the estate for particular people, 156 or to avoid Family Protection claims. 157 The Matrimonial Property Act again recognizes this problem and offers the possibility of restraining or setting aside dispositions made by one spouse with the intention of defeating a matrimonial property claim by the other spouse. 158 The Social Security Act also seeks to prevent spouses from depriving themselves of their assets and income, but does so by treating those deprivations as if they had not occurred. 159 Other family members have to rely on conventional remedies, such as the equitable tracing rules, 160 but once again they are unlikely to protect their interests sufficiently. Special remedies, similar to those in the Matrimonial Property Act, might be more effective in preventing apparent owners from alienating their assets and thus interfering with family property rights.
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Needless to say, these remedies will in turn affect inter vivos property dealings with innocent third parties, particularly if the scope of the family relationship is uncertain. Whereas marriage is a matter of public record and the property interests of the spouses are well known since the passing of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, the same certainty is currently lacking in other family relationships.
Family property interests can also be adversely affected by the survivorship rule in joint tenancies. Couples frequently own much of their property as joint tenants. On the death of the first partner, the property passes automatically to the survivor, and never forms part of the estate.
162 Accordingly it is not available for claims under the Family Protection Act. The large number of stepfamilies means that property acquired by one family could well end up in the hands of another, thus defeating the family property principle. Full implementation of a family property concept will accordingly necessitate a re-examination of joint tenancies.
Finally, and most importantly, the full adoption of a family property concept would conflict with the rest of the law of property, which is entirely based on private property principles. This is presumably the reason why the protective measures which do exist are generally only indirect in nature and do not set aside offending transactions. 163 Tracing rights are subject to strict controls which are aimed at protecting innocent third parties. 164 The provisions in the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 in terms of which transactions may be set aside are subject to the condition that the alienations were made with the intention of defeating spousal claims to the property in question. 165 If a family property concept is to be adopted it would require a review of the whole law of property.
While this list of implications does not purport to be exhaustiveindeed it may be only the tip of the iceberg -it is sufficient to indicate that recognition of a family property concept is a major inroad into conventional property rights of individual owners and will affect property dealings well beyond the family circle. The notion of private property, still very much a part of our society, is severely jeopardized if family membership is allowed to override individual rights. The idea of a family property concept has far reaching consequences, which should be carefully considered before making such a radical change to existing property principles.
Many of the recent developments do not meet with public approval. Although the economic reforms were introduced through the democratic process, the government of the day could rely on a comfortable majority in Parliament and could thus ignore the opposition. That is no longer the case in New Zealand, nor is it likely to occur again, now that Parliament will be chosen on the basis of a Mixed Member Proportional representation system. 166 Public opposition may be more difficult to ignore in the future. This may not only prevent the formal adoption of a family property concept, it may also reverse the liberal interpretation of the Family Protection Act and restrict the financial assessment measures in the Social Security Act.
CONCLUSION
As we stand on the threshold of the twenty first century, New Zealand can look back on a period of significant development in the field of family property law. Private property rights were virtually unrestricted for the first half of the century, but have been substantially eroded in the latter half. We have moved from a narrow duty of personal support for dependant family members to a position where a concept of family property is beginning to emerge.
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This development is in part the result of judicial activism and in part attributable to the Government's economic policies of the last decade. Each body has a different reason for limiting private property rights to protect family interests. The judiciary has sought to resolve family disputes by distributing property between the parties in an equitable manner. The Government, on the other hand, is attempting to cut public expenditure by transferring much of the financial burden it had assumed earlier this century back to the family.
Both the Government and the judiciary are indirectly, if not directly, forcing society to abandon the ideas of individualism inherent in a concept of private property and to place family rights ahead of personal rights. This approach does not accord with general principles of property law. Previously enjoyed property rights are being curtailed and some mechanisms have been introduced to prevent, or at least discourage, owners from avoiding their responsibilities. Both the judiciary and the Government are being criticized for their attempts to limit the rights of owners to deal with their property as they wish. Few people seem to accept that their responsibilities towards their family should extend beyond a narrow duty of support.
The fact that these developments have occurred in a piecemeal fashion is also a matter of concern. Given the potential impact on private property rights and commercial dealings generally, there is a need for a comprehensive approach involving all aspects of property law in the context of the family. That has been lacking throughout this century. 168 This area of law affects all New Zealanders, but they have had little opportunity to influence the developments which have occurred in recent years. As the Law Commission and government departments embark upon further reform in this area, it is hoped that the New Zealand public will at last have the opportunity of deciding whether we should adopt a family property concept or revert to conventional private property principles subject only to a personal right of support. Given the criticism which the recent developments have received, it seems unlikely that further erosion of private property rights will meet with public approval. 3 Enforcement of this right was available through the Destitute Persons Act 1877. * The law of succession and the distribution of matrimonial property on death and divorce are currently being reviewed by the Law Commission of New Zealand. 5 Where property has been purchased with money provided by a person other than the person in whose name title is taken, the legal owner holds the property on a resulting trust for the person who provided the money: Anon (1683) [1962] NZLR 6 at 9 Barrowclough CJ did not feel empowered to override the testator's disinheritance of his daughter because she was not in financial need, even though from a moral point of view and as a sign of contrition for his past neglect his Honour thought that the testator should have made some provision for her and most right thinking people would have condemned a father for failing to do something of that sort. 19 In a recent survey of 235 cases brought by adult children under the Family Protection Act between 1985 and 1994, 53.5 per cent succeeded on the grounds of financial need: at 225.
*° Social Welfare Reform Bill 1994, d 34 provided that in a daim for financial means assessment to determine eligibility for a residential care subsidy, the Director General of Social Welfare could have refused, cancelled or adjusted any benefit applied for if the applicant, in the opinion of the Director General, should have sought further provision under the Family Protection Act or the Matrimonial Property Act from his or her deceased spouse's estate. This dause was struck out when the Bill was reported back from the Sotial Services Committee on 26 July 1995. At the time of writing this artide, the reasons for striking out the dause were not known to me. The problem of second guessing what a court in the exercise of its discretion under the Family Protection Act and the Matrimonial Property Act might have awarded in the circumstances of the particular case was an obvious reason. It may also be a reflection of the current balance of power in Parliament, which is slowing down some of the more draconian economic changes which Government is wishing to pursue.
41 Inglis (1960) at 299. The effect of the current policies is discussed by Jackson and Pool (1994) . Angus and Gray (1994) provide a Department of Social Welfare perspective.
" Fisher (1984) at 4-6; Bradbury (1995) . 43 Fisher (1984) at 8; Bradbury (1995) at 64-5. 44 Fisher (1984) at 8. A resulting trust arises in these circumstances by virtue of a presumption of advancement where there is an obligation, recognized in equity, to support or provide for the person advanced: Hanbury and Maudsley (1989) " Ibid at 726.
x The long title to the Act provides: 'An Act to reform the law of matrimonial property; to recognize the equal contribution of husband and wife to the marriage partnership. . .'. S 11 provides that each spouse shall share equally in the matrimonial home and the family chattels; and s 15 provides that the balance of matrimonial property shall also be divided equally unless one spouse's contribution to the marriage partnership has been clearly greater than that of the other spouse. This distinction is discussed by Bridge (1992) at 235. 39 Dissolution by death presented different problems for which the proposals for property distribution on divorce were not appropriate. The effect on wills and intestacy provisions also required further consideration, which would have delayed the introduction of the Bill: the White Paper accompanying the Bill (1975) at 13-4. Further legislation was planned at the time, but has not as yet been enacted. 60 In Mora v Mora [1988] 1 NZLR 214, for example, Holland J acknowledged that the widow had borne seven children, brought them up and run a thrifty and frugal household to reduce the couple's indebtedness. She had also worked on the farm so that they were spared the extra expense of employing someone. Yet his Honour assessed the value of her contribution only at 25 per cent. The Court of Appeal overturned his decision and awarded her 40 per cent of the deceased estate. 81 The change started with Mora v Mora ibid. A summary of decisions after this case can be found in (1991) 14 The Capital LttUr nos 6, 7 & 8.
" A constructive trust in these circumstances arises by operation of law, irrespective of the owner's intentions, because justice and good conscience require that an aggrieved party obtain restitution: Hanbury and Maudsley (1989) 
